The revelation principle [4] is a cornerstone tool in mechanism design. It states that one can restrict attention, without loss in the designer's objective, to mechanisms in which A) the agents report their types completely in a single step up front, and B) the agents are motivated to be truthful. We show that reasonable constraints on computation and communication can invalidate the revelation principle. Regarding A, we show that by moving to multi-step mechanisms, one can reduce exponential communication and computation to linear. Regarding B, we criticize the focus on truthful mechanisms. First, we study settings where the optimal truthful mechanism is NP-complete to execute for the center. In that setting we show that by moving to insincere mechanisms, one can shift the burden of having to solve the NP-complete problem from the center to one of the agents. Second, we study a new oracle model that captures the setting where utility values can be hard to compute even when all the pertinent information is available-a situation that occurs in many practical applications. In this model we show that by moving to insincere mechanisms, one can shift the burden of having to ask the oracle an exponential number of costly queries from the center to one of the agents. In both cases the insincere mechanism is equally good as the optimal truthful mechanism in the presence of unlimited computation. More interestingly, whereas being unable to carry out either difficult task would have hurt the center in achieving his objective in the truthful setting, if the agent is unable to carry out either difficult task, the value of the center's objective strictly improves. While we are not the first to study computational or other benefits of insincere mechanisms (for example, see [2, 3] ), we are not aware of other work where efficient insincere mechanisms are successfully used to improve on the objective value of the best (not necessarily computationally efficient) truthful mechanism.
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SINGLE-STEP VS. MULTI-STEP
While it is known that multi-step mechanisms can save revelation compared to single-step mechanisms, it has not been clear whether these savings can be drastic. For one, Christos Papadimitriou recently (at the DIMACS Fall 2001 workshop on Computational Issues in Game Theory and Mechanism Design) posed the question of whether multistep mechanisms can yield an exponential reduction in communication/computation. The following theorem shows that this is the case even in very simple settings. 
TRUTHFUL VS. INSINCERE -COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
The fact that multi-step mechanisms have computational and communication advantages over single-step mechanisms has been observed before and explored to a certain extent already, as discussed above. However, the revelation principle has another questionable facet: it states that restricting attention to truthful mechanisms comes at no loss in the objective. In this section we show that, interestingly, under limited computational resources, this restriction does incur such a loss. The following is (in our opinion) our most interesting result: 
Sketch of proof.
The following are the key properties of the setting constructed in the proof. The agent has an exponentially large type space. For many of the types, the interests of the designer (who wishes to maximize social welfare, including the utilities of parties other than the typereporting agent) and the agent coincide-that is, they would both choose the same outcome. (Call these the no-conflict types.) Moreover, for each of the no-conflict types, the designer's preference for this optimal outcome is strong enough that the social welfare of the overall mechanism cannot be maximized unless the mechanism chooses this outcome for this type. However, for (at least) one of the agent's types (the conflict type), the interests do not coincide, and the agent may prefer the outcomes chosen for some of the noconflict types over the ones that the designer would prefer for the conflict type. But, deciding whether this is the case (whether such a no-conflict type exists) is NP-complete! Now, if such a no-conflict type exists, an optimal truthful mechanism must, for the conflict type, choose an outcome that is good for the agent (to maintain truthfulness); but otherwise, it should choose one good for the designer. Thus, it is NP-complete to determine which outcome an optimal truthful mechanism should choose for the conflict type. However, the (not necessarily truthful) mechanism that always chooses the outcome in the designer's best interest is not NP-complete to execute; moreover, if the agent successfully manipulates this mechanism for the conflict type (which requires the agent to solve the NP-complete problem), the outcome is no worse than what the best truthful mechanism would have chosen; and if the agent fails to manipulate it (even though it was possible), the outcome is strictly better. 2 Put in perspective, the mechanism designer would reap two benefits from using the second, insincere mechanism rather than a truthful mechanism:
1. Doing so shifts the computational hardness from the center to the agent. This can also be seen as a statement about how the social welfare that can be obtained by truthful mechanisms compares to the social welfare that can be obtained by insincere mechanisms, as follows. If it is computationally infeasible to execute the optimal truthful mechanism, the designer might resort to another truthful mechanism which merely approximates the social welfare obtained by the optimal truthful mechanism (this is exactly the approach taken in algorithmic mechanism design).
2. If the agent cannot consistently solve instances of an NP-complete problem, then, even if the agent is trying to act strategically, using the second mechanism improves social welfare in some cases (and never decreases it).
Hence, (by the second argument) the insincere mechanismwhich is computationally feasible to execute-outperforms the optimal truthful mechanism (in terms of social welfare), which (by the first argument) in turn outperforms any computationally feasible truthful mechanism.
TRUTHFUL VS. INSINCERE -VALUATION COMPLEXITY
Finally, we question the focus on truthful mechanisms when determining valuations is hard. We focus on the following abstract model of this. Suppose that there is a commonly accessible oracle which, when supplied with an agent, that agent's type, and an outcome, returns a utility value for that agent. This oracle is the only available means for determining agents' utilities for outcomes. Depending on the supplied type, the query may be costless, or carry a constant (computational) cost. In this setting, we obtain the following analogue of Theorem 2: 
